In wireless environments, the issue of mutual authentication and key agreement with user anonimity is challenging. Recently, Mun et al. proposed 
Introduction
Authenticated key exchange enables two or more parties communicating over a public network to generate a high-entropy cryptographic key (also known as a session key) [1] [2] [3] . In recent years, wireless and mobile communication systems bring people more and more convenience [4] . Wireless network makes people use mobile devices to access all kinds of services anytime and anywhere. However, the movement and open access in ubiquitous mobile wireless environments have raised some security issues such as user's privacy. Authentication with anonymity is fundamental. Many authentication and key agreement protocols for wireless environments have been proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . In 2004, Zhu et al., presented an anonymous wireless scheme based on the smart card [5] . However, Lee et al., [10] pointed out that Zhu-Ma scheme cannot achieve perfect backward secrecy and mutual authentication and cannot resist against a forgery attack. Lee et al. proposed a new authentication and key agreement protocol for wireless environments to overcome the weaknesses of Zhu-Ma scheme. Chang et al., [11] , Wu et al., [9] and Xu et al., [6] showed that Lee et al.,'s scheme failed to provide user anonymity,respectively. To remedy the weakness, they proposed their improvement respectively. Unfortunately, He et al., [7] showed that Wu et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to several weaknesses such as failing to provide user anonymity. But their improved scheme is shown by Li et al., in [8] that it lacks user friendliness and fairness in key agreement and suffers from attacks against user anonymity. Step 3. MU puts N into the smart card.
Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
Step 1. MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and inputs identity IDMU and password PW. Next, the card generates a random nonce N' and computes
Step 2. MU→FA: {ID HA , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 }.
Step 3. FA→HA:
Then FA stores the received ID HA from MU for further communication.
Step 4. After receiving the message from FA, HA computes h(IDMU ||PW)*= h(x)  c 2 and searches its database for h(PW||N) corresponding to h(IDMU ||PW)*. Then HA computes
HA checks if c 5 '= c 5 . If they are equal, HA authenticates MU. HA then selects a random number a and computes aP. Next, HA computes
Step 5. HA→ FA: { ID HA , ID FA , c 6 , c 8 , aP }.
Step 6. FA →MU:
FA checks the format of ID HA and ID FA and stores aP before FA transfers the message to MU.
Step 7. MU checks the format of ID HA and computes c 6 '= h(K||h(PW||N')|| h(PW||N)) then checks whether if c 6 '= c 6 . If they are equal, MU can authenticate HA. Next, MU decrypts E V (aP||c 7 ) and obtains c 7 . MU computes c 7 '= h(IDFA||h(PW||N')|| h(PW||N)) and checks if c 7 '=c 7 . If they are equal, MU authenticates FA. MU then selects a random number b and computes bP, K MF =h(abP) , and S MF =fK MF (ID FA ||bP).
Step 8. MU→FA: {bP, S MF }. 
Update Session Key Phase
Step 1. MU→FA: {b i P}.
MU selects a random number b i (i=1,2,…,n) and computes b i P. MU then sends b i P and to FA.
Step 2. FA→MU: {a i P, SMFi }.
FA selects a random number a i (i=1,2,…,n) and computes
FA then sends {a i P, SMFi } to MU.
Step 
Security Analysis of Kim-Kwak's Scheme
Next, we demonstrate that Kim-Kwak's scheme suffers from several deficiencies.
Unfairness in Key Agreement
A key agreement protocol is called fair only when the agreed session key is determined by the cooperation of each involved entity. That is, no one can control the session key. We find that Kim-Kwak's scheme is not really a fair key agreement scheme. During the authentication and key establishment phase, HA selects a random number a and computes aP in Step 4, while MU selects a random number b and computes bP in Step 7. The session key is computed by the FA and MU according to K MF =h(abP). Obivously, FA has not taken participant in choosing the parameters related to the session key.
Flaws in Design
Firstly, the registration message {h(IDMU||PW),h(PW||N)} of each user is kept in the HA, which makes the protocol susceptible to the stolen-verifier-attacks. Next, when the user's password is expired or leaked and the user MU would like to update his/her password, the MU must ask the HA to update the database. Because {h(IDMU||PW),h(PW||N)} must be kept in the database of HA. It is very inconvienent for both the MU and the HA.
Secondly, during the authentication and key establishment phase, the two random numbers a and b are chosen by HA and MU, respectively. Thus, FA does not know a. Upon the assumption of CDH, it is infeasible for FA to compute abP without knowledge of a or b from aP and bP. Therefore, FA cannot calculate the session key K MF = h(abP). This is a serious flaw of design.
Replay Attack
Kim et al., claimed that their scheme could resist against replay attack. However, we found that an attacker could mount replay attack. Suppose that an attacker has eavesdropped the message {ID HA , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 } transmitted from MU to FA during the authentication and key Step 3. The attacker selects a random number b and computes bP, K MF =h(abP) , and S MF =fK MF (ID FA ||bP).
Impersonation Attack
Any attacker can impersonate MU to update session keys (even if the attacker has not mounted the above replay attacks). The update session key phase in Kim-Kwak's scheme, has no mutual authentication mechanism. Only the user can authenticate FA. Thus the attacker can select freely a random number b i (i=1,2,…,n) and compute b i P. The attacker then sends b i P to FA. Therefore the attacker computes a session key KMFi h(a i b i P) using the received a i P from FA. Similarly, Kim et al.'s scheme [12] suffers from such impersonation attacks in the update session key phase.
Attacks Against The User's Anonymity
In wireless environments, an attacker can intercept the communication channel between MU and FA. Consider that MU roams into a foreign network and sends the login message 
The proposed Scheme
The notations of the proposed scheme are the same as those in Kim-Kwak's scheme. HA chooses the public parameters: a finite field q F over a large prime q and an elliptic curve group with an order n point P over the curve. HA selects x in q F as the master key and computes the public key P HA =xP. FA selects y in q F as the private key and computes the public key P FA =yP.
Registration Phase
Step R1. MU→HA:
MU chooses a random N and password PW, then computes h(h(ID MU  N)  PW).
Step R2. HA chooses a random Z and computes V =h(x||ID
. HA then issues a smart card containing {V,R, h()} to MU.
Step R3. MU puts N into the smart card.
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Login Phase
Step L1. MU inserts the smart card into the card reader and keys ID MU Step L2. MU→FA: {ID HA , A, e 1 }.
Authentication Phase
Step A1. FA→HA:
FA chooses a random number Step Step A3. HA→FA: {ID HA , e 4 }.
HA computes L=xA  C and e 3 =SE L (A||ID HA ||B||N 1 ) . Then HA encrypts e 3 ||ID HA ||T HA ||(A  B) with F and generates e 4 .
Step A4. FA→MU: {e 3 }.
FA decrpts e 4 with the shared F and checkes if T HA is valid and the extracted ID HA , A  B equals to the received ID HA , A  B. FA sends e 3 to MU and computes the session key K = h(bA).
Step A5. MU (in fact, the smart card) computes L=aP HA 
Password Change Phase
Step P1. If MU wants to change password, MU inserts his smart card into the card reader and keys ID MU and PW. Afterwards, the smart card asks the user if MU changes the password. If MU resubmits a new password PW new and a new random N new , the smart card computes
Step P2. The smart card replaces {V, N} with {V new , N new }.
Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security propertities and performance of the proposed privacy-preserving authentication and key agreement protocol.
C which contains ID M as C =h(x||ID HA ||ID MU ) and R =h(x||ID HA )  SE x (ID MU ||Z). Thus, FA has no way of knowing ID MU without the private key x of HA. Moreover, since A and e 1 depend on two random numbers a, N 1 and the login time T MU , the login message {ID HA , A, e 1 } is different from each other. Thus, any attacker who controls the communication channel cannot still trace dowm the user by comparing A or e 1 in our proposed login scheme even if any attacker has intercepted all the transmitted message between FA and MU. Therefore, the user's anonymity is well protected. Provide perfect forward secrecy: If an adversary has HA's master keys x, the adversary can recover {A, B}. However, it is infeasible to work out aB or bA from {A, B} on the assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman. Thus, the adversary cannot compute the session key by the formula K =h(aB) or h(bA).
Provide fairness in key agreement: The session key is determined by {A, B} which is chosen by MU and FA. So, MU and FA can share a session key. Even HA cannot work it out. It is important. But in Xu et al.'s schem [6] , HA can obtain the session key of MU and FA.
Performance Analysis
Of the schemes [6-9, 12, 13], Li et al.,'s scheme [8] achieves all the security requirements. For performance analysis, we compare the computation cost of our scheme and Li et al.'s scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed Kim-Kwak's scheme and showed that their protocol is susceptible to tractability of the user, impersonation attack and replay attack. Moreover, it cannot provide fairness in key agreement. There is a serious flaw of design which will not make FA to obtain session key. We proposed an enhanced scheme which removes these security flaws. We also demonstrate that our scheme has more security properties and hold high performance compared with the previous scheme.
